According to the University of Ghent study on Atypical Employment in Aviation (2015), more than 1 in 6 pilots in Europe are “atypical” employees, i.e. working through a temporary work agency, as self-employed, or on a zero-hour contract with no minimum pay guaranteed (no flight = no pay).

Young pilots are particularly affected by such precarious employment. 2 out of 5 (almost 40%) of 20-30 year-old pilots report having no direct employment relationship with their airline. Some airlines offer their cadets a position at deplorable conditions, or even resort to ‘Pay-to-Fly’ schemes where the pilot actually pays the airline to fly their aircraft on (revenue-earning) flights. 

Those pilots working for Low-Cost Carriers (LCCs) are most affected. In fact, LCCs are the largest ‘users’ of atypical employment, in what the Ghent researchers see as a clear divide in the employment market between traditional network carriers and low-cost ones:

•    In LCCs only half of the pilots are directly employed (53%), while 15% are self-employed, 11% fly for an airline via an own (e.g. limited liability) company, and 17% are working on a temporary agency contract. 
•    Self-employment is one of the most prevalent types of atypical employment. 7 out of 10 of all self-employed pilots work for an LCC.
•    In network carriers, these “atypical practices” represent a significantly lower share of their workforce: 0.6% of pilots are self-employed pilots, 0.4% fly via an own company and 1.7% work on temporary agency contract, i.e. a total of 2.7%.

So, why are these big proportions and the continuous increase of these “atypical employment” practices throughout the industry so troubling? What can policy-makers, airlines and employees do to stop it?

Taking self-employment as an example, according to research, this has become one of the most prevalent types of atypical employment (7 out of 10 of all self-employed pilots work for LCCs, according to Ghent University). Yet, ‘self-employment’ among pilots is – overwhelmingly – a status used to disguise what in reality is regular employment. It allows the airline to “shift” social security contribution to the employee, to gain maximum operational flexibility, while minimising its risks – e.g. those related to fixed flight hours, to sickness, pregnancy or fatigue of crews. 

For pilots this means that their contracts can be scrapped without notice and flight hours could be withheld. They are paid less or no fixed salary, so they would rely on higher or exclusive use of pay-per-hour, requiring them to fly more hours in order to secure their living. On top of that, there is often uncertainty about which labour law applies to self-employed pilots, which country’s social security rules apply and where to pay taxes. Bringing up a labour dispute or challenging their employment status in Court is also not straightforward as they are unclear about the jurisdiction they are covered by. All this manoeuvring by airlines is to save money and to gain competitive edge vis-à-vis other airlines that do not use such self-employment practices. 

This is possible because legislation governing the status of self-employed workers, and labour laws in general, varies from country to country in Europe. Also, only very few countries carry out labour inspections on their airlines, or actively prevent companies from misclassifying the status of an employee. This could easily be addressed if national Civil Aviation Authorities and Labour Inspectorates step up their activities and cooperate both nationally and transnationally. It is positive though that the nature of this (bogus) employment relationship has recently been challenged by a number of tax investigations, as well as by Labour Inspectorates. 
 

Casualisation of labour in aviation is more than just about avoiding social security and taxes. It raises potentially serious concerns about the safety of the industry, as the way that pilots are employed (or rather not ‘employed’) can have repercussions on safety decision-making within Europe’s cockpits. When commercial considerations start weighing in the process, the focus on safety is blurred.

According to the Ghent University, nearly half of self-employed pilots struggle to amend instructions of the airline based on their own safety or liability objections! This alarmingly high number means atypical employment can have an influence on the independent decision-making process and safety choices made by crews during or before flight (i.e. balancing the airline’s commercial considerations against the safety considerations). 

Similar conclusions were reached by another scientific study among more than 7.000 European pilots. In this study by the London School of Economics (LSE) and EUROCONTROL (Nov. 2016), atypically employed pilots have a significantly more negative perception of their airline’s safety culture than their directly employed colleagues – thereby unveiling a big gap between pilots on atypical and typical contracts. Accordingly, atypical employees are

•    less encouraged to voice safety concerns
•    feel more obliged to take uncomfortable risks
•    are less confident on fair treatment of the safety reporter
•    less satisfied with confidentiality of reporting and investigation processes
•    less involved in safety activities
•    feel more inclined to go to work when sick
•    more often tired at work
•    less confident to file fatigue reports.
 

Precarious atypical form of aircrew employment also acts as a significant entry barrier to the profession. 

Especially in times of growth, the aviation industry needs significant numbers of new, well qualified pilots to fly the growing number of aircraft. However, on top of the already harsh day-to-day reality of the pilot job, precarious broker agency contracts, artificial ‘self-employment’ set-ups, zero-hour contracts or Pay-to-Fly schemes are definitely not something that will attract young men and women.

Feeding the industry with a sufficient supply of motivated and well qualified pilots therefore relies largely on secure direct employment contracts, governed by the local law of the country where the pilots have their home base. Atypical forms of employment, by contrast, will act as a major deterrent.
 

After years of inaction on the side of the European Commission and most EU Member States, awareness about the downsides of atypical crew employment is growing and calls for concrete solutions are increasing. In October 2018, several EU Member States issued a joint Ministers’ Declaration, calling for a ‘socially responsible connectivity’ in aviation, and several airlines and crew associations, incl. ECA, issued a joint statement on the ‘Social Agenda’ in aviation. Furthermore, the Social Agenda was one of the key items at the EU Aviation Summit, in Vienna, (Oct. 2018), where the need for a strong social pillar of EU aviation was stressed.

To tackle atypical employment, several parallel actions are needed, at EU, national or company level:

• Establish direct and indefinite employment contracts as the general form of employment relationship between the pilot and the airline.
• Ban Pay-to-Fly (P2F) schemes and ‘zero-hour’ contracts across Europe, and prevent the quasi-permanent use of temporary agency contracts. 
• Conduct thorough and regular labour inspections, incl. transnationally, to identify and combat abuses and illegal use of atypical employment.
• Make sure that aviation is not an exception: apply to airlines’ employees and effectively enforce national & EU legislation in the social/employment domain (e.g. aircrew working under a wet-lease agreement are to be considered posted, hence be subject to the EU Posting of Workers Directive for the time of their assignment).
• Ensure each and every airlines applies to its crews and their contracts the local labour & social security law of the country where the crews have their home base, rather than the laws of another country (e.g. country of registry).
• Make best use of the future European Labour Authority (ELA) to enhance cooperation among Member States, enforce legislation and to fight abuses and fraud in the area of aviation.
• Revise the EU Air Services Regulation 1008/2008 in a manner that complements the Single Aviation Market’s economic freedoms with a “Social Pillar” which ensures that economic liberalisation in aviation becomes socially sustainable.
• Address negative safety repercussions, making use of Article 89 of the new EASA Basic Regulation (‘Interdependencies between civil aviation safety and socioeconomic factors’) to ensure that atypical forms of air crew employment do not compromise flight and passenger safety.